Relating the SDC’s exclusion from the Geneva Conference and the Constitutional Committee with Turkey’s counter-lobbying efforts alone would be an oversimplistic conclusion.
“This is a momentous task — to establish a foundational act, a social contract for Syrians — after a decade of conflict and amid deep divisions and mistrust”, says Geir Pedersen, UN Special Envoy for Syria ahead of the third session of the Constitutional Committee on 24 August.
A delegation of 150, comprising 50 representatives from the Assad regime, 50 from the Syrian opposition groups and 50 representatives from the NGOs will be gathering in Geneva under a predetermined format. The discussions are expected to conclude with the selection of a group of 45 people to be tasked with drafting a new constitution of Syria.
Pedersen underlines the “real need for constructive diplomacy among key international players.” and expresses hope that opportunities for direct contacts will allow them to bridge significant gaps.
However, the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) -the multiethnic social and political coalition of mainly Kurdish communities and Arab tribes -exercising hegemony over more than 2 million population in northeast Syria and already controlling one third of the country’s territory, including oil reach areas, a major dam and irrigation system and responsible for incarcerating the ISIS prisoners of war and their families- are excluded from the talks under staunch opposition by Turkey’s one-man regime.
Turkey since 2014, percieves the extended hegemony of Democratic Union Party [Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (PYD)] in Syria’s Kurdish controlled areas alongside its southern borders as a “national security threat”. Under this pretext Turkey has twice invaded and occupied two major Kurdish settlements Êfrin and Serakanî in 2018 and 2019 and forcibly evicted at least 300 thousand Kurds from their homes and redistributed their property among Ankara’s proxy jihadist mercenaries.
Northeast Syria -named “Rojava (West) Kurdistan” by the Kurds- following the withdrawal of Syrian regime forces in 2013-14 for deployment on the western front to fight the jihadist uprising had fallen under ISIS occupation. It was finally liberated under the leadership of the Democratic Unity Party (PYD) and by the armed resistance of People’s Protection Units (YPG) and Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) formed out of youth and women of northeast Syria, including Arabs and Armenians as well as Kurds. The resilient defence against the siege of Kurdish towns by the ISIS and their liberation and eventual rise of autonomous local self-governments inspired by the teachings of the incarcerated PKK leader Öcalan has always created vexed feelings in Turkey.
Turkey’s Kurds during 2014 ISIS attacks across northeast Syria, launched an arduous campaign and took to the streets and flooded the border areas in order to force the Turkish government bring war on ISIS, as Ankara claimed itself part of the international anti-ISIS alliance. However, Turkey’s president Erdoğan, while denying even lifting a finger to stop ISIS terrorists, further mocked Kurds concerns for their kind on the other side of the border to announce the imminent fall of Kobanê in the hands of ISIS, stirring further agitation.
As the demonstrations assumed massive dimensions across Turkey’s Kurdish provinces the unrest peaked on 6-7 October 2014 when pro-government paramilitaeries joined fighting alongside security forces against the Kurdish protesters out on the streets. The protest wave ebbed as ISIS had to lift the Kobanê siege under US air strikes and in face of the fierce Kurdish resistance in Kobanê. At least 50 people, mostly Kurdish protesters, lost their lives during the 6-7 October disturbances and the carnage remains yet uninvestigated.
Since then the “Rojava revolution” what swept the local Kurdish and Arabic communities on the other side of Turkey’s long southern borders with Syria has become Ankara’s major concern. Erdoğan and the Turkish military elite are obsessed with the deep skepticism that Rojava’s autonomous self-governments (“Cantons”) would provide the rear front for the Kurdish insurgency inside Turkey and label the PYD and YPG as “terrorist organisations”. Hence, exclusion of the Kurdish self-rule in Syria from international platforms and its final annihilation has become Turkey’s first priority in defence and foreign policy.
Bassam Saker, a member of the SDC in Washington, criticizes their exclusion in the upcoming Constitutional Committeemeeting in Geneva, describing it as a big mistake: “The contradiction in demands of both the Syrian government and the opposition reveals the absence of the real intentions of making change, which may lead to the failure of Geneva talks.”
“Turkey tries to impose its dominance over the region to achieve its dream in reviving the Ottoman Empire.” Saker told with regard to Turkish policies in the region. Yet he pointed to Moscow’s serene strategy based on undermining and limiting the Turkish role in Syria, as it minimizes Turkish-held areas without any reaction by Erdogan.
Indeed, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has from the beginning frequently pointed to the negative impact of Turkey’s insistence for the exclusion of Kurds from the talks on the outcome of the Geneva process. “Without this party, without this participant the talks cannot achieve the results that we want, a definitive political resolution in Syria,” Lavrov had told journalists at his main annual press conference in 2016. Yet, he guaranteed that Russia would not “veto” the talks.
According to the critics, the composition of the Constitutional Committee is diametrically opposite of the discourse that surrounds its justification. It is neither balanced nor inclusive the critics say, excluding voices from the larger Kurdish groups in eastern Syria and largely excluding most Syrians from the process. Thus, providing a larger area of maneuver for Assad and Turkish-backed opposition groups to veto over the participation of others.
During the initiation of the Constitutional Committee the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) -the joint Rojava defence- spokesperson Mustafa Bali had warned: “The UN must know that having a couple of Kurds from northeast Syria who are allied with Damascus or the opposition doesn’t mean Kurds are represented in the committee.”
“Turkey has vetoed Syrian Kurds representation in the UN Syrian Constitution Committee.” adds Bassam Ishak of the SDC. “Few Syrian Kurds and Syriacs [Christians] are chosen as members of the Syrian opposition.”
However, Ambassador James Jeffrey, the US Special Representative for Syria, in response to questions during a teleconference from a group of Turkey-based journalists seems to have led pro-Erdoğan media raise eyebrows that the US might be considering to give green light for a sort of SDC participation in Gemeva.
Jeffrey in a previous teleconference with the US-based media on Aug. 13 was asked by American journalists if they had “a vehicle for including representatives of people from that area [northeast Syria] in the Constitutional Committee or the discussions about Syria’s future?” and the US Special envoy responded: “[…] the Autonomous Administration […] is something that the people of northeast Syria set up, largely to administer territory that had been abandoned by the Assad regime when ISIS, of course, started spouting up in 2013, 2014. We’re looking at ways to ensure that the Constitutional Committee and the process reflects the will of all of the Syrian citizenry, including the people in the northeast.”
The same Jeffrey had to respond the same question on Aug. 17 during the teleconference with the Turkey-based media, by the Deutsche Welle Turkish service. The answer by the US Special Representative, a former US Ambassador to Ankara was very carefully tailored for the Turkish environment: “The members of the Syrian Constitutional Committee, the participants in the negotiations, are selected from the whole country. Participation is not based on a specific, organizational structure,” Jeffrey told.
His disregard of “participation based on organizational structure” diplomatically implies that SDC participation in the Constitutional Committee is out of question but still some participation from northeast may be considered. This definition may hint some Kurdish figures close to the conservative Kurdish National Council (ENKS), given their proximity to the Syrian opposition and their distance with the SDC. Ankara could also welcome this opportunity for driving a wedge between contending Kurdish groups in Rojava.
Indeed USA, Russia, France and many other big powers seated in the UN Security Council have been cooperating and negotiating and concluding various commercial and military agreements with the SDC since its birth. Therefore it might sound oversimplistic to relate SDC’s exclusion from the Geneva Conference and the Constitutional Committee with Turkey’s counter-lobbying efforts alone.
Big powers have benefited from the SDC partnership in the fight against ISIS in turn for immense Kurdish human loss; the SDC is the only political force outside the Damascus controlled areas who has been able to end civil war and provide peaceful conditions for inhabitans; the SDC appears as the sole political entity in the Middle East based on secular governance and the principle of multi-faith; Rojava is the only piece of land in the Middle East where women enjoy de facto as well as de jure freedom from male domination and can protect it with a defense force.
Thus, SDC uniquely fits the qualifications set as the basis of the agreement for the Constitutional Committee which calls on parties “to respect the UN Charter, as well as Syria’s sovereignity, unity, independence and integrity, and theSyrian-led and-owned nature of the process.” This is why the exclusion of the SDC -the only genuinely Syrian element who comprises a key stone both for the territorial integrity of Syria and for the freedom of its peoples and their faiths- from the Constitutional Committee would inevitably lead to the collapse of the Geneva process as foreseen by Russian foreign minister Lavrov.
Yet; if all big powers, in spite of all these historical and political clues are converging on the exclusion of one of the key elements for a lasting solution in Syria from the Geneva talks, then all parties are benefiting from a prolonged conflict. A Geneva process without Kurds, i.e. a Syria without peace is for the benefit of all; not only for Ankara.
_________________________
bianet.org, Aug. 23, 2020
Yorum yazabilmek için oturum açmalısınız.